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Summary findings
In  1989 the government of Guinea enacted far-reaching  They conclude that, compared with what might have
reform  of its water sector, which had been dominated by  been expected under continued  public ownership, reform
a poorly run public agency. The government signed a  benefited consumers, the government, and, to a lesser
lease contract for operations and maintenance with a  extent, the foreign owners or the private operator.
private operator, making a separate public enterprise  Most sector performance indicators improved, but
responsible for ownership of assets and investment.  some problems remain. The three most troublesome
Although based on a successful model that had operated  areas are water that is unaccounted for (there are many
in C6te d'Ivoire for nearly 30 years, the reform had  illegal connections and the quality of infrastructure is
many highly innovative features.  poor), poor collection rates, and high prices.
It is being transplanted to several other developing  The weak institutional environment makes it difficult
countries, so Clarke, Menard, and Zuluaga evaluate its  to improve collection rates, but the government could
successes and failures in the early years of reform. They  take some steps to correct the problem. To begin with, it
present standard performance measures and results from  could pay its own bills on time. Also, the legislature
a cost-benefit analysis to assess reform's net effect on  could authorize the collection of unpaid bills from
various stakeholders in the sector.  private individuals.
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H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please  contact Hedy Sladovich, room MC2-609, telephone 202-473-7698, fax 202-
522-1154,  email address hsladovich@worldbank.org.  Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at
www.worldbank.org/research/workingpapers. The authors may  be contacted at gclarke@worldbank.org or menard@univ-
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In  1989, the Government of Guinea enacted a  far-reaching reform of its  urban
water sector, which until that time had been dominated by a poorly run public agency.  The
government signed a lease contract for operations and maintenance with a private operator
and made a separate public enterprise responsible for ownership of assets and investment.
Although it was based upon a successful model that had been operating in C6te d'Ivoire
for nearly 30 years and similar reforms have since been enacted throughout Africa, at that
time,  the reform was highly innovative.  Indeed, the World Bank, which  was heavily
involved in advising the government on design and implementation, had to implement new
internal procedures to  handle  the institutional  structure.  Because this  model  is being
transplanted to  other developing countries, a thorough evaluation of the successes, and
failures, in the early years of reform will be invaluable for policymakers throughout the
region and in other developing countries.
It is important to keep in mind that the reform was enacted under very difficult
circumstances.  The public  agency, the Enterprise Nationale de Distribution de  l'Eau
Guineenne (DEG), which  was in  charge of  the  sector before reform,  was inefficient,
overstaffed  and virtually insolvent. Fewer than 40 percent of Conakry residents had access to
piped water - low even by regional standards.! Further, service was intermittent, at best, for
the lucky few with connections.  Many residents drank polluted well water and even more
relied upon it as a secondary source of drinking water when the piped system was not
operating.  By  1983, Conakry residents had  to  line  up  at neighbors  connections  and
standpipes for hours hoping for service.  After several years of discussions and delays, the
government  instituted  a  major  reform,  which  introduced  significant  private  sector
participation in the sector. 2 At the same time, a large World Bank-led project, the Second
Water Supply Project, was initiated  to allow expansion  of the system.
In this paper, we evaluate the success of the institutional arrangements in the first
eight  years  following  reform.  In  addition  to  standard performance  measures  (e.g.,
productivity and profitability), we present results from a cost-benefit analysis proposed by
1. According  to a UNDP-World  Bank survey from 1992,  approximately  27 people used each
connection  including family, neighbors, etc. (Durany and Morel a l'Huissier, 1994, p.19).  If
anything,  this might overestimate  the number  of people  with access  to piped  water - the technical
director  of SONEG  estimated  only about 15 persons  per connection.  Using  the higher  number  (27
people  per connection),  an estimate  of 1,000  people  per standpipe  (based  upon the average  number
of people  per standpipe  in 1992  from Durany  and Morel a l'Huissier, 1994)  and population  figures
from United  Nations  (1996),  this implies  a coverage  rate of 38 percent  in 1989.
2.  See Clarke and Menard (2000a) for a discussion of the political economic situation
concerning  reform.
2Jones et al. (1990) and Galal et al (1994). This allows us to assess the net effect of reform
on the different parties involved in the sector.  Although there have been some problems,
we conclude that, compared to what could have been expected under continued public
ownership, reform benefited consumers, the government and, to a lesser extent, the new
foreign owners.
The paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we briefly describe the situation
before reform, including sector organization and performance.  In Section 3, we describe
the effect of reform on sector and enterprise performance.  In Section 4, we describe the
cost-benefit analysis.  In  particular we  describe how we  constructed  a  counterfactual
scenario, which  specifies  what  would  have  occurred if  reform had  not  taken  place.
Although this is speculative, any discussion of the effects of reform has to make, at least
implicit, assumptions about whether changes that occurred were due to reform or not.  By
specifying a counterfactual, we make these assumptions explicit. We also discuss the short
projection period.  In Section 5, we describe the results from the cost-benefit analysis and
the  sensitivity  analysis  that  was  conducted  making  different  assumptions  in  the
counterfactual scenario.  The final section concludes.  Except where explicitly noted all
performance measures refer to national operations, since both the private company and the
public enterprise produce only national accounts.  Although assessing the affect of reform
on Conakry alone would make the study more comparable with the other case studies in
this  project,  the  detailed  data  needed  to  do  this  is  not  available. 3 However,  since
consumers in Conakry accounted for 86 percent of water billed and 73 percent of private
connections over the period studied, we expect these results to reflect the effect of reform
on Conakry residents reasonably well.
2  Sector Performance and Organization before Reform
According to a consultants report from 1985, there were 8,990 legal connections to
Conakry's water system at the end of 1983, for a city with about 800,000 residents.  In
comparison, Abidjan, which was about twice the size of Conakry and had a long history of
private participation in the sector, had over 90,000 connections (SODECI, 1986).  Most
private conmections  were a  single tap inside a lot or compound - only a small wealthy
minority had running water inside their homes (Durany and Morel a l'Huissier,  1994, p.19).
Deputies, senior civil servants and DEG employees were entitled to legal, but unregistered
(and unbilled) connections and there were many illegal connections.  In principle, water
distribution  was metered and consumers were charged according to consumption  but, in fact,
metering was very rare.  The lack of metering makes it difficult to  estimate how high
3. The other  case studies  are  Argentina  (Alcazar,  Abdala  and Shirley,  2000); Chile (Shirley,  Xu
and Zuluaga, 2000); Cote d'Ivoire (Clarke  and Menard, 2000b); Mexico (Haggarty,  Brook and
Zuluaga,  1999);  and Peru (Alcazar,  Xu and Zuluaga,  2000).
3unaccounted-for-water (UFW) was, with  estimates varying between 35 percent  and  60
percent.
Most non-connected residents relied upon neighbors'  connections or water  from
wells. In 1992, 29 percent of Conakry residents used well water as their primary source of
drinking water.  Further, about 50 percent of people with access to piped water used well
water as their primary alternate source of drinking water when the system was not working
(Durany  and  Morel  A l'Huissier,  1994).  Because  the  sewerage  system  was  under-
developed, well water was heavily polluted.  In 1992, 80 percent of households relied upon
primitive sewerage facilities in their courtyards. 4 Sludge from the pits  attached to these
facilities leaks into the phreatic layer from which households  draw well water.
The water supply system is not underdeveloped  due to scarcity.  Rainfall is plentiful
and although water from the highly polluted (and saline) aquifer under Conakry is unsuitable
for drinking, the huge reservoir at Grandes Chutes could provide sufficient water to satisfy
Conakry's needs. 5 Including water available at the outlet of power plant the reservoir could
potentially produce over 500,000 m3/day (World Bank, 1989),  whereas, even by 1996, billed
consumption was only about 30,000 m3/day. 6 Although plenty of raw water was available,
DEG's  productive capacity was far lower than potential production.  Average production
from Grandes Chutes, which was constrained  by the size of the pipeline from the dam to the
city and treatment facilities,  was only 44,000 m3/day. 7
The public agency, the Enterprise Nationale de Distribution de  l'Eau  Guineenne
(DEG), that  was in  charge of the  sector was a  department of the Ministry of Natural
Resources and Environment (MNRE). Although, in theory, it could act as an autonomous
agency  and,  under  its  statutes, had  a  board  containing  representatives  from  several
ministries,  in  practice,  its  board  never  met  and  MNRE  treated  it  would  any  other
department (World Bank, 1989, p.2).  Consequently, DEG had no autonomy and suffered
from many of the problems that plagued the rest of the civil service.  For example, the
4. 21 percent  of these facilities  are simple unlined  pits, 39 percent are pits lined with cement,
and 29 percent  consist of two separate  pits that are only rarely connected  to a cesspit  (Durany  and
Morel A  l'Huissier,  1994,  p.19).
5. World  Bank (1989)  also notes that the complex  geography  of the Conakry  peninsula  makes
it difficult  to abstract  significant  amounts  of water from  boreholes.
6. Although potential production was high, actual productive capacity was limited by the
transmission  pipeline from the Grandes Chutes dam, which could carry only 45,000m3/day.
Additional water was available from the Kakimbon  well field (7,000m3/day)  and Kakloulima
Springs  (2,000m3/day).
7. World  Bank (1987)  and World  Bank (1998). An additional  I0,000m31day  is available  from
other sources  (World  Bank, 1989).
4government's policy (in the early 1980s)  of guaranteeing  employment  to university graduates
meant that DEG, like the rest of the civil service, was extremely  overstaffed. By 1984, DEG
had 504 employees, a ratio of 34 employees per 1,000 connections (World Bank, 1987, p.
38).  Even compared to other public water utilities in West Aflica this was high. 8 Further,
because salaries  were low, and often  not paid, DEG employees  had little or no incentive  to do
their  jobs.
The poor state of the DEG's  accounts makes it very difficult to  accurately assess
DEG's financial performance before privatization. The 1985 consultants' report concluded
that DEG's poor accounting practices, the non-availability  of most relevant data, and the
division of DEG's budget between several different ministries, made it impossible to even
perform an audit. Similarly,  in 1989,  the World Bank (1989)  concluded,  "the shortcomings  of
DEG's accounting  systems are such that they largely preclude attempts to observe trends and
base forecasts" (p. 19).  However, keeping in mind the limitations imposed by the poor
quality of data, DEG's  financial performance appears to have been very weak.  By 1984,
DEG owed over US$4 million in unpaid interest and was over US$14 million in debt. Very
few private customers willingly paid for water and many were not billed at all. 9 Since the
private billing and collection rates were so low, DEG managed to continue to operate only
because the Government  generally  paid its water bill and sometimes  provided large subsidies.
Even this source of funds was unreliable and non-payment  by the government  led to frequent
conflict  with donors. 10
Even if DEG had operated efficiently and collected billed amounts from customers,
tariffs were too low to cover costs.  Before June 1986, when tariffs were increased to GF
60/m 3 ($0.12/m 3), water tariffs were GF 10/m 3 ($0.02/m 3).  Even after the increase, the price
was considerably lower than prices in other West African countries (see Figure 1) and far
lower than estimates  of long-run  marginal cost. 1I
8. There  were 32 and 24 employees  per 1,000  connections,  respectively,  in the public utilities
in Togo  and Benin  at this time. The  private operator  in CBte  d'Ivoire had only 9.8 employees  per
1,000  connections  at that time (SODECI,  1]986).
9. The 1985  consultant  report  estimated  that less than 12  percent  of private users  were billed in
1982. Even  the few customers  that were billed generally  did not pay.  In 1987,  DEG issued  bills
for approximately  GF 800 million,  but collected  only about  GF 100  million  (World  Bank, 1989,  p.
2).
10. For example,  in  the late 1980s, the World Bank waived provisions for a structural
adjustment  loan that had required  the administration  settle its water and electricity  bills promptly
(World  Bank, 1990).
11. Based upon DEG's actual expenses  and estimates  of the optimal  level of operating  and
maintenance  costs,  World  Bank (1987,  p 19) estimated  that the average  incremental  cost of water
5In  summary,  due  to  low
tariffs,  poor  commercial
habits  and  inefficient
production,  DEG  was
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Figure 1: Price of Water before Reform  years  of  discussions  with
Source:  World Bank documents.  donors, and in the context of
a larger structural adjustment
program,  the  government  decided  to  solicit  bids  for  a  private  operator  to  assume
responsibility for sector operations. 12
3  Sector Performance and Organization Since Reform
3.1  Sector Organization Following Reform
Upon reform, two enterprises were created: Societe d'Exploitation Des Eaux De
Guin6e (SEEG), the (majority) private-owned operator, and Societ6 Nationale des Eaux de
Guinee (SONEG), the state-owned enterprise that manages sector infrastructure.  SEEG,
which operated under a ten-year lease contract with SONEG, pays SONEG a 'rental fee' for
the use of sector assets. Figure 2 shows sector organization and the pattern of ownership of
the two enterprises.
(AIC) was about  US$0.25/m3. However,  even  this might have been somewhat  low, given that in
1989,  World  Bank (1989,  p. 20) estimated  that the AIC in Conakry  was US$0.82/m3. In practice,
these  estimates  should  be treated  with caution  due both to the large differences  in the estimates  and
to the poor state of DEG's accounts. However,  they do indicate  that prices would have been too
low to cover  sector  expenses,  even  if bill collection  had been reasonable.
12. See Menard  and Clarke (2000a)  for a full discussion  of the political economic  motivation
for reform.
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100%  49%  51%  including  building  and
maintaining  the  secondary  and
|  "  |  tertiary distribution networks (i.e.,
pipes under 160mm in diameter),
SONEG  SEEG  metering, billing  and  collecting.
Lease  The  private  owners  are  two
Figure 2: Organization  of Sector  French  companies,  SAUR  (a
subsidiary  of  Groupe
BOUYGUES, a French company mostly involved in public works) and Vivendi (formerly
Compagnie Generale des Eaux), a French infrastructure enterprise.  All contracts issued in
Sub-Saharan Africa to private sector enterprises between 1990 and 1997 in the water sector
involved either (at least one of) these companies  or Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux, another French
infrastructure enterprise (Silva et al., 1998).  In addition to the lease contract with SONEG,
the two French partners and SEEG signed a management contract, under which the new
owners would provide managerial support to SEEG.  The management contract specified
that  the  foreign  companies  were  to  provide  home-office  support  for  day-to-day
management, select expatriate staff, and audit procedures.  Remuneration was set  at 2
percent of SEEG's revenues  (World Bank, 1989, p. 9).  As their contribution to SEEG,
SAUR and  CGE provided 51 percent of the  initial US  $3 million of  capital.  For  its
contribution,  the Government donated equipment and infrastructure  from DEG and, through
SONEG, took responsibility for accumulated  sector debt. The private owners are responsible
for nominating the General Manager, while the government is responsible for selecting the
Chairman of the Board.
SONEG is a small, entirely state-owned government  agency, which reports to a board
of directors and the Ministry of Natural Resources and Energy.  SONEG owns sector assets
and is responsible for investment planning, sector accounting, and servicing sector debt.  In
theory, the rental fee makes SONEG financially independent of the government (i.e., the
rental fee is supposed to cover SONEG's operating costs and allow SONEG to service debt
and finance some portion of investment).  SONEG is also responsible for financing and
supervising most large-scale investment (e.g., reservoirs and transmission pipelines) and for
the construction and maintenance of the primary distribution network (i.e., pipes more than
160 mm in diameter).
Conditional on reform taking place, international donors, led by the World Bank,
agreed to finance a large investment  project. In addition to subsidizing  prices during the first
7years of reform (see below), the Second Water Supply Project had four main investment
components.13
i.  US $4 million  to support SONEG, including support for technical assistance, consultants,
training and equipment.
ii.  US $4 million to rehabilitate existing facilities.
iii. US  $1 million to provide consultants' service for studies of secondary centers and to
design a training program for staff laid-off  from DEG.
iv.  US $58 million to expand the Conakry water system, including increasing the capacity of
the pipeline between Grandes Chutes and Conakry, the addition of a new treatment plant
and extension of the distribution  network (including 15,000  new connections).
3.2  Finance
Since  reform,  SEEG  and
$50  SONEG have financed their
$40  41  operations in very different
$30  1  11ways.  Whereas  SONEG
obtains most of its funding
$20-  from  donors,  SEEG  relies
_  S10a  ; *  heavily  on  internally .0  $10
E  l  *  *  *  ;  *  generated cash.  Figure  3
$0  _  shows SONEG's sources of
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 -$10  funds.  Between  1990 and
1996,  over  56  percent  of
funds came in  the form  of
ESecond  Water  Project  0 Other  Funds  &  Grants  l  ands  cand  ints  from  of
|  Net  intemal  Cash  Generation  loans  and  grants  from  the
Second Water Project  (see
Figure 3: Sources of Funds for SONEG (millions  of 1996 US$)  above).  An additional 36
Source: SONEG and  authors'  calculations.  percent of funds were in the
form  of  'grants  and  other
funds'.  Bilateral donors provide most of the funds in this category, although between 1989
and 1995, we also include the government's contribution to service sector debt.  Internal
cash  generation (i.e., the 'rental  fee'  paid by  SEEG) accounted for only  a  very  small
portion of SONEG's funds over this period.  The enterprise's high dependence on donor
funding is not surprising given that its largest expenditures are related to investment - it
will  be  very  difficult to  fund  investment  through  the  tariff  until  coverage  expands
significantly.
13. Actual expenditures were different from planned expenditures.
8In contrast, after the initial
equity  contribution,  SEEG
10o  generated almost  all  of its
8  - funds internally - about 95
6  *  percent  of  SEEG's  funds
4 - since 1990 (see Figure  4).
2  _  - - *  *Since  privatization,  neither
o  _  _  _,  1991  the  government  nor  the
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  private  investors  have
|  Net  Internal  Cash  Generation *  Increase  in Long-term  debt  contributed  any  additional
paid-in  capital  and  SEEG
Figure  4: Sources  of Funds for SEEG (millions of 96 US$)  has  taken  on  very  little
Source: SONEG and authors' calculations.  additional  long-term  debt.
Since SONEG accounts for
a greater share of funds than SEEG (compare Figure 3 and Figure 4), total internal cash
generation accounted for about 16 percent of sector cash flow between 1990 and 1995.
3.3  Fixed Capital Formation
Investment  increased
after reform  (see Figure
160-  17).  In  1987 and 1988,
140-_ average  annual
910  investment  was  $4
100  million  (in  1996 US$). 80-
°  60 - 4  Between 1990 and 1996,
m  40  average  annual
20  investment  increased  to
0  about  $19  million  (in
1989  1991  1993  1995  1996 US$).  This led to a
large  increase  in  gross
-4-  Gross  Capital  1fixed  capital (see Figure
5).  As  noted  above,
most  investment  was
Figure  5: Gross Fixed Capital (SEEG and SONEG)  funded  through  loans
Source: SONEG and authors' calculations.  (mainly  through  the
Second Water project) and bilateral grants from donors.  The most significant investments
over this period were intended to increase productive capacity in Conakry.  These included
the construction of an additional treatment plant, an additional pipeline to bring water from
Grandes Chutes and two additional storage reservoirs.
93.4  Prices
One of the major goals of reform was to make the sector financially self-sufficient
within six years (including servicing sector debt, financing-some  portion of investment and
paying a fair return to  SONEG and SEEG's capital).  Since prices were thought to be
below long-run marginal cost,  large tariff increases were necessary (M6nard and Clarke,
2000a). Recognizing that this would be difficult to do for political reasons, the government
agreed to heavily subsidize prices for six years following reform through the World Bank
credit.  Consumer tariffs were immediately increased'to 150 FG/m 3 in 1989 (about $0.25/m 3)
to cover all of SEEG's and SONEG's local currency costs (e.g., salaries for local staff).
However, the foreign currency costs (e.g., for imported equipment and supplies) were
covered by proceeds from the World Bank loan, while the government continued to service
part of sector debt.1 4 These subsidies slowly declined until  1995, by  which time  the
consumer tariff was supposed to cover all costs (see Figure 6).  Prices have been allowed
to increase far more quickly than originally planned.  By  1996, the average tariff had
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Figure 6: Consumer Rates and Subsidies from World Bank and Government
Source:  SONEG.
14.  The World  Bank contributed  US $16.9  million  to subsidize  the scheme. The subsidy  was
described  as 'support  for the rehabilitation  of sector  operations'  in World  Bank documents  and was
designed  as support  for the institutional  building  that was needed  to implement  the lease contract.
The original  appraisal  was for $15.4  million,  but the final sum ended up being somewhat  higher
(World  Bank, 1998,  p. 17).
10At the end of 1997, the minimum bimonthly payment for service was  13500 FG
(about US$13).  This fixed payment included payment for the first 20 cubic meters of water
and had to be paid in full whether the household consumed the whole 20 m3 or not." 5 The
price of water between 20 and 60 cubic meters was 850 FG/m 3 and the price above 60 cubic
meters was 925 FG/m 3. In  addition, it costs 90,000 FG (about US$90 in  1996) to  be
connected  to the system.
The most common complaint during field interviews was that the price of water
was too high. 16 In general, it is very difficult to compare prices across countries.  First,
tariff schemes vary greatly across countries - for example, it is hard to compare prices in
countries that are fully metered with those where customers pay lump-sum tariffs.  Second,
the cost of providing water also varies greatly between countries.  For example, whereas
the water system in Conakry is gravity fed, water in Mexico City has to be pumped from a
source that is 140 kilometers away and 1,000 meters below the city.  On the other hand,
Conakry's system is far smaller and less dense than the systems in the other case studies,
increasing costs in Conakry.  Finally, water systems are often heavily subsidized (often in
non-transparent ways), making comparisons even more difficult. Unlike systems in many
other  developing  countries,  Conakry's  system  provides  sufficient  revenues  to  cover
operations and maintenance and service sector debt.  Finally, since prices are adjusted
infrequently and the devaluation rate in many African countries is extremely fast, it often
difficult to compare prices in US dollars.
15.  A similar  pricing  scheme  is used in Cote d'Ivoire.
16. Similarly,  the organization  for consumer  protection  wrote "living  standards  in Guinea  make
it impossible  to pay the price charged  by SEEG"  (World  Bank, 1998,  p.32)
11With  these  provisos,  however,
prices in Guinea do appear high,
$1.20  especially when compared to the
$1.00  Latin  American case studies (see
$0.80  Figure 7).  When compared to
$0.60  other African countries, prices in
$0.40  Guinea  remain  higher  than
$0.20  _;l  |  -- |-|  |  *  |  |  5  average, although not completely
$0.00oo . . . . . . . out-of-line  with  the  other
countries  (see Figure 7).  One
final point is  that the  tariff  for
Un  ,,,  - ~  >  ,  low-income  consumers  in
cc  Guinea  is  high  compared  to
tariffs for  similar  consumers  in Figure 7: Average Price per Cubic Meter Billed in Africa  other  countries.  For  example,
and  Latin  America
although the  average tariff  was
Source: Menard and Shirley (2000) and World Bank files,  higher in Uganda than in Guinea
($0.96  vs.  $0.84),  the  metered
tariff for domestic users was lower in Uganda than the 'social' tariff for low-income users
in Guinea ($0.57 vs. $0.64).
3.5  Coverage
Although  the  number  of  (legal)  connections  increased  after  the  lease  was
implemented, the increase was slower than anticipated and coverage remains low.  Under
the Second Water Supply Project, 15,000 new connections were planned (nationwide) by
1995; however, only 11,000 of these connections had actually been implemented by mid-
1997. By the end of 1997, there were about 31,000 connections in Guinea, including about
25,000 connections in Conakry (population of about 1.7 million).  In comparison, there
were close to  180,000 connections for 2.7 million inhabitants in Abidjan, C6te d'Ivoire
(SODECI, 1996).  Based upon this data, we estimate that less than half the population of
Conakry had access to piped water at the end of 1997 (see, Menard and Clarke, 2000a).
The new pipeline from Grandes Chutes, and the investment in other production
facilities, combined with the modest expansion of the distribution network meant  that
productive  capacity far  outstripped consumption.  Potential water production increased
from 54,000 m3/day in 1988 to 100,000 m3/day by the end of 1993 (World Bank, 1998). In
contrast, average daily production was 60,345 m3/day in Conakry in  1996, reflecting the
17.  Data  for Uganda  is for 1995  from Dinar  and Subramanian  (1997).
12extremely high rate of UFW - average billed consumption was only 30,255 m3/day.8 If
SEEG and SONEG can reduce the rate of UFW to around 20 percent (i.e., the rate in
Abidjan), current productive capacity should adequately service needs in the medium-term,
even if the number of connections increases significantly.  For example, by comparison,
average daily water production of 205,000 m3 provided adequate service for the whole of
Abidjan, a much  larger city with  nearly eight times as many connections as Conakry
(SODECI, 1996, p.22).
3.6  Billing and Collection
Bill collection from private
consumers, which had been
140 - very  low  before  reform,
120  x  |  w  <  \improved  significantly.
80, . However,  it  remains  low
60 - compared to other privately
40  _  operated  systems  in
20  developing countries (e.g.,
1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  the private collectionrate is
98 percent in Abidjan, COte
--- Private  -UAdministration  d'Ivoire).  In  1989 and
1990,  75  percent  of  the
Figure 8: Collection  Rate (as  percentage  of amount  billed), . ~amnount  billed  to  private
Note: The collection  rate can exceed  100  percent  when  unpaid  bills  consumers  was  actually
from previous  years  are paid in the current  year.  collected.  This fell to under
Source:  SEEG.colce.Tsflltunr
Souce  S50  percent  between  1991
and 1992, before recovering to around 60 percent through 1996 (see Figure 8). SEEG is able
to,  and actually does,  cut off water to  customers who do not pay  their bills for three
consecutive months.  Field interviews with households,  businesses and local administrations
confirm that SEEG does this consistently, although its implementation may raise sporadic
protests.  In addition, the practice of allowing civil servants and deputies to have unbilled
connections was ended.  For the first two years of the lease, under donor pressure, the
government paid  its bill regularly (see  Figure 8).  However, in  1991 the government
collection rate fell to less than 50 percent, and then dropped further, to close to 10 percent, in
1993.
18. In addition, average daily production  and billing do not vary greatly over the year - in
1996, the maximum  average daily production  and billed consumption  for any two-month  period
was 61,693  m3 (April-May)  and 30,255  m3 (June-July).
133.7  Revenues
Total  Revenues  have
$25.0  increased  in  real  terms
D  $20.0 --  ..  quite  noticeably  since
$15.0o  1990  (see  Figure  9).
°  $10.0  |  Between 1994 and 1996,
.°  $5.01  ~~  ~  total revenues from water
sales  fell,  although  this
90  91  92  93  94  95  96  was  compensated  for  by an  increase  in  SEEG's
* Miscellaneous  revenues  -SEEG  'miscellaneous'  revenues.
a Revenues  from water  sales  - SEEG  The  miscellaneous
X  Revenues  from  water  sales  - SONEG  revenue  appears  to  be
Figure  9: Revenues  for  Water  Sales  and  'Other'  (million  1996  US$)  from  the construction  of
water-related facilities on Note: Revenue  from  water  sales  includes  connection  charges.  behalf  of  SONEG.
Source:  SONEG.
SEEG receives  a  greater
share of both total revenues and revenues from water sales than SONEG does (about 65
percent of revenues from water sales and about 74 percent of total revenues in 1996). This
is not surprising given that SONEG finances most of its activities through grants and loans.
Expenditures  on  wages  and
intermediate inputs, for SEEG
70%  - and  SONEG  combined,
60%-  consumed between 48 percent
50%  and 62 percent of total revenue
40% - between  1989  and  1996  (see
30%  Figure 10).  Since SEEG is far
larger  than  SONEG  (500
20%  c  employees at SEEG compared
10%_______________  _  to  44  at  SONTEG  in  1997),
0%  expenditures  on  wages  and
89  90  91  92  93  94  95  96  intermediate  inputs  are
s___  Intermediate_Inputs  primarily  expenditures  by
UIWages  *Intermediate  Inputs  SEEG.  In  1996,  SEEG
Figure  10: Wages and Intermediate Inputs (as percentage of  accounted  for  90  percent  of
revenues)  total wage  expenditures  and  87
Note:  Includes wages, intermediate inputs and revenues for both  percent  of  expenditures on
SEEG  and SONEG.  intermediate  inputs. Source: SONEG.  According to  field interviews,
the  salaries  for  the  five
14expatriate managers at SEEG accounted for about 15 percent of expenditures on wages and
salaries in 1994-1995 (i.e., only about 1.6 percent of total revenues).
By  1996,  interest
payments  and  repayment
50%  of  principle  consumed,
40%  respectively,  about  17
30%  percent and  19 percent of
20%  revenues from water sales
10%  (see  Figure  11).  We
0%  compare interest payments
90  91  92  93  94  95  96  and  the  repayment  of
principle  with  revenues
* Interest  Payments  (%  of  water  sales)  from  water  sales,  rather
U Repayment  of Principle  (%  of  water  sales)  than  total  revenues,
because  these  payments
Figure  11:  Interest  Payments  and  Debt  Service  (as  percentage  of  are  made  by  SONEG,
revenue  from  water  sales)  which  receives  revenue
Note: Includes  revenues  from  water  sales  and connection  charges  only  from  water  sales.
(i.e., excludes  'miscellaneous'  revenues  for SEEG. Between  1990  Between 1990 and  1996,
and 1995,  interest  payments  include  expenditures  on debt  service  by  i
the government,  since government  paid a  (declining)  share of  interest  payments  of sector
payments  on  old  debt  over  this  period.  debt increased from about
Source:  SONEG  and  authors'  calculations.  $2.0  to  $2.8  (in  1996
US$).'9 Since  1996,
principal repayment on many new loans from the Second Water Project has started and
new  loans have been taken  out under the Third Water Supply and  Sanitation Project.
Consequently,  interest  payments  and  principal  repayment  was  projected  to  increase
significantly after 1996 - SONEG projected that interest and principal repayment would
increase by 226 percent by 2005.  Consequently, without large increases in coverage or
prices, the share of revenue consumed by debt service is likely to grow.
19.  Note that the estimate for 1990 includes debt service expenditures  by the government
between 1990 and 1995, since it subsidized  debt service  payment over this period (see below).
Consequently,  actual  payments  by SONEG  were considerably  lower  between 1990  and 1995.
15As discussed in the previous
section,  collection  rates,
35%  although  higher  than  they
30%  were  before  privatization,
25%  have been consistently quite
15%  low.  Consequently,
10%  provisions  for  bad  debt
5%  consume a large portion of
0%  . revenue.  In  1996,
90  91  92  93  94  95  96  provisioning  for  bad  loans
cost  SEEG  and  SONEG
*  Provisions  for  Bad Debt  (%  of water  sales)  aout  $3.0 m  n  (iN19
about  $3.0 million  (in  1996
US$) - about  18.4 percent
Figure  12: Provisions  for Bad Debts  (as percentage of  water  of revenue  from water  sales
sales)  (see  Figure  12).  In
Note:  Includes  revenues  and  provisions  by  both  SEEG  and  comparison, for SODECI in
SONEG. Revenues  include connection  charges  (i.e., they exclude  t  v  p  for
'miscellaneous' revenues).  Cote d Ivoire  provisions for
Source: SONEG.  bad debt accounted for only
about 2.8  percent  of  (pre-
tax) revenues.  Improving billing, through  both  improving government  payment  and
making it easier for SEEG to  collect from non-paying private customers, would allow
SEEG to reduce prices quite substantially.
3.8  Unaccounted for Water
As  noted above, estimates of  unaccounted-for-water  (UFW) varied  considerably
before reform.  By 1996, when metering was complete, UFW stood at about 50 percent. 20
Although it is difficult  to say whether UFW has improved, it remains high compared to either
international  standards  (between 10 and 20 percent) or to other water systems in West Africa.
Several factors contribute to the high rate of UFW in Guinea.  First, although it is
very difficult to estimate the number of illegal connections accurately, they appear to be a
large problem, especially in sections of the city where the old pipes are buried only a few
inches underground.  This makes it easy to connect to the system illegally - it also means
that the pipes are easily broken (e.g., by heavy vehicles).  A related problem, especially in
the older part of the city, is that overlapping lots and interlaced households make it very
difficult to interrupt water supply and to control connections. In addition to the direct theft
of  water, leakage from poorly  maintained illegal connections contributes to  the UFW
20. Ninety-five  percent of connections  were metered  by 1996  and, therefore,  it is easier to
estimate UFW accurately.
16problem.  Further,  officials  from  SEEG note that  it is  very  difficult, in  the  existing
institutional environment, to  prosecute persons with  illegal connections and, therefore,
there is little the company can do to deter this behavior.
Although theft  plays  a  role,  poor  maintenance and  ancient infrastructure also
contributes to the problem.  However, there might be  little reason to  devote significant
resources to reducing UFW due to leakage. As we have shown, potential production outstrips
both consumption and actual production. Consequently, SEEG can continue to increase the
number of connections without reducing UFW.  Further, since the system is gravity-fed, the
marginal cost of a cubic meter of water is low - essentially  the cost of treatment.  Although
SEEG's accounts are not detailed enough to estimate the marginal cost per cubic meter, most
costs (e.g., provisioning for bad debt, debt service and salaries)  would not appear to depend
heavily upon quantity of water provided.  For this reason, it might not be  economically
desirable to devote a large amount of resources to reducing UFW. Although with hindsight it
might be argued that the productive capacity added under the Second Water Project could
have been delayed if UFW had been reduced instead, this was not clear at the time the project
was proposed.  UFW was thought to be considerably lower before metering was complete
and, therefore, consumption  was thought to be close  to productive capacity. 21
IAlthough  the reason that SEEG has not reduced UFW is that SEEG pays the rental
fee to  SONEG based on bills collected, not on water produced or delivered by SONEG.
Therefore, since SEEG does not pay for raw water and does not lose sales due to UFW, it has
little incentive  to spend money to reduce it. One possible reform that might encourage SEEG
to reduce UFW would be to make SEEG pay SONEG the (estimated)  marginal cost of water
for water delivered  to SEEG in addition to the full rental fee for bills collected. Although this
would increase SEEG's costs, if the money were paid to SONEG  it would not have any effect
on sector costs and, therefore, tariffs would not have to be increased. That is, the 'rental fee'
per  cubic meter of  water collected could be  reduced, leaving SONEG's  total revenues
unchanged.
3.9  Water and Service Quality
Although it is difficult to find exact data, there is almost universal agreement that the
quality of piped water improved significantly after reform. Before reform, water was often
21. Before reform, productive  capacity was about 54,000 m3/day (World  Bank, 1989). In
1996,  by which time metering  was complete,  billed consumption  was only about 30,255  m3/day.
This would leave some space for UFW and for seasonal  variation  in consumption  (which is quite
low in Guinea)  without  increasing  productive  capacity. However,  because the estimate  of UFW
was too low, it was unclear  at the time of reform  that actual  consumption  was that low. Further,  it
was hoped  that the  number  of connections  would  grow  faster  that they actually  did.
17visibly polluted and was not safe for human consumption. For example, the manager at the
local Coca-Cola bottling plant noted that while the water was muddy and discolored for
several years after reform, regular tests confirm that it now meets the standards imposed by
their international  headquarters. The Organizationfor Consumer  Protection in Conakry rates
water quality as excellent and notes that it can be consumed as delivered (World Bank, 1998,
p.31).  Similarly, a 1994 study, which measured chemical and bacteriological contamination
in piped and well water in Conakry, concluded that piped water "was found to comply with
WHO norms for drinking water" (Gelinas  et al., 1996,  p. 2017).
As noted above, however, water-related  health problems remain a major issue due to
the large number of customers who consume unsafe water from contaminated wells. These
difficulties are confirmed by  data on  sickness traditionally related to  unsafe  water and
inadequate sewerage,  particularly those of group 1, which remain the main source of mortality
(in decreasing order: malaria, diarrhea,  hepatitis A, poliomyelitis, and skin diseases). Gelinas
et al. (1996) suggest that the use of piped water, rather than well water, would reduce the
incidence of water-borne  diseases (p. 2017).
The reform has  also  had  a  positive impact on  customer service.  Delays  for
connecting new  customers are reasonable,  although many  consumers  complain about
SEEG's conservative policy of bundling customers before connecting them (i.e., waiting
until a large group of consumers pay deposits before expanding the network).  Similarly,
although there are some complaints about delays getting repairs done, there is  general
agreement that this is not a major problem.
3.10  Profits and Profitability
Before reform, DEG was losing large amounts of money.  Following privatization,
SEEG's operating profits were close to zero until 1993 when they started to increase.  By
1996, they reached GF 6.8 billion ($6.8 million in 1996 dollars).  The increase in SEEG's
profits after 1993 coincided with a decrease in the 'rental fee' that SEEG paid to SONEG.
Although the average consumer rate remained at GF 880 between 1994 and 1996, the share
of the tariff that SEEG paid to SONEG fell from GF 527 in 1994 to GF 370 in 1996.  One
constant drain on SEEG's accounting profits has been the large charges that it has taken for
unpaid bills.  Between 1989 and 1996, provisions for bad debts were close to 20 percent of
operating revenues (Figure 12).
18In  1989-90,  SONEG  lost
about  $2.8  million  (Figure
$12  13).  However, profits slowly
$10 
8  improved  through  1995,
:  $6  reaching  $6.1  million  that
<,,  $4  s  >_  year.  In  1996,  SONEG's
o  so  operating  profit  became
negative  (-$4.1 million)
-$4  s  once  more.  The  decline
-$6  appears to be due to the sharp
+Accounting  Profits  (SONEG)  -- Accounting Profits  (SEEG)*  drop in the  'rental fee' that
|  Public Profits  SEEG  paid  to  SONEG  and
the end of the subsidy that the
Figure 13: Private and Public Profits  government paid SONEG for
debt  service  (GF  88/m 3 in
Note:  'Private' profits for DEG before privatization.  1994).  Although  SONEG
Source:  Authors' calculations,  appeared  profitable  in  1995,
this  appears to  be  due  to  a
large one-time increase in non-operating income (from GF 396,000 in  1994 to GF  9.6
billion in 1995). Without this, SONEG would have also lost money in 1995 - close to $3.7
million.
Figure 13 also shows 'public'  profits over the period since reform.  Public profits
include returns to debt-holders (i.e., interest payments), to the government (i.e., net taxes),
depreciation  and  deducts the  opportunity  cost  of  working  capital  (both  SEEG's  and
SONEG's). 22 This  measure  was  a  little  greater  than  zero under  public  ownership.
Following privatization, it increased significantly in real terms, remaining positive through
the entire period.
3.11  Productivity
Figure  14 shows two partial productivity indicators for labor - connections per
workers  and  output per  worker.  Both  indicate an  immediate improvement upon  the
signing of the lease contract.  This was primarily due to the large reduction in the number
of workers which immediately followed reform.  DEG employed about 504 workers before
reform,  while  after  reform  SEEG  and  SONEG  had  only  312  and  43  employees
respectively.  After this immediate increase, connections per employees failed to increase
significantly and actually dropped between 1994 and 1996. The increase in 1997 was due
22. Depreciation  is included  to avoid  the use of accountants'  rates. See Galal et al. (1994)  and
Jones  et al. (1990)  for a full description.
19to a large increase in the number of connections that year (23,435 in  1996 compared to
about 31,000 in 1997).
The  second  measure  of
70  __________-_______________  productivity is real output per
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Figure  14: Indicators  of Labor  Productivity  for  SEEG  and  following  reform,  revenues
SONEG  from  construction  and  other
Note: Includes employees of both SEEG and SONEG following  works  related  to  the  water
reform.  sector increased  more quickly.
Consequently,  output  per
employee continued to increase, even as connections per employee stagnated.
20The  final  measure  of
productivity  is  total  factor
0.7-  productivity  (TFP),  which
0.6-  also increased at the time of
0.5-  reform.  However, since this
0.4 - time,  TFP  has  also  slowly
0.3  - declined (although remaining
0.3  considerably  higher  than  it
0.2'  (  was  before  reform).  The
0.1  most noticeable  decline was
0  the large drop in 1993.  This
1987  1989  1991  1993  1995  was mainly due to the large
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|+-Total  Factor  Productivity  |Figure  5)  due to  investment
Figure  15-  Total  Factor  Productivity  for SEEG  and SONEG  i  production  facilities. Fiue.5  Since  a  large  part  of
Note:  TFP  include inputs from both  SEEG and  SONEG  productive  capacity  remained
following  reform.
Source:  Authors' calculations.  unused by the  end of  1996,
due to the slow development
of the distribution network, total factor productivity should increase as the distribution
network expands.
3.12  Fiscal Effects
Before  reform,  the
government  had  been
120%  heavily subsidizing DEG by
100%  paying a large fixed sum for
80%  water  and  paying  an
60% - additional  subsidy  by
40% - servicing  sector debt.  The
20\ - total  subsidy  that  the
20%  >\  government  provided  to
0%  DEG was about $3.1 million
1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  (in  1996 US$) in  1987 and
% of  debt  servce  paid  by  government  1988  (see  Figure  19).  As
part  of  a  transitional
Figure 16:  Percentage  of Debt  Service  Paid  by Govermnent  agreement,  the  government
agreed  to  provide  a
21amount did not fall significantly until 1994 when the subsidies were ended (see Figure 19).
It  appears that the reason that the payment did not fall, although the government was
paying a smaller share, was that debt service increased due to borrowing associated with
the second water project.
Even after the subsidy provided from the government's budget, it was thought that
it would be politically difficult to immediately increase prices enough to cover operating
expenses and to provide a fair return on capital.  Consequently, as noted above the World
Bank provided a loan that was used to subsidize a declining portion of costs.  Since this
money was provided through a loan guaranteed by the government, we treat  this  as a
government subsidy (to SEEG) in the cost-benefit analysis below.  Although this might be
an appropriate way to handle this loan, there are arguments against treating it in this way.
First, the loan is entered onto SONEG's balance sheet as a liability and, therefore, will
presumably be serviced through higher tariffs (rather than from government revenue).  In
this respect, the subsidy is more like a cross-subsidy from future consumers (who will have
to  pay  interest and  repay principal through  higher tariffs) to  current  consumers  (who
benefit  from lower  tariffs immediately).  However, in  practice,  since the  cost-benefit
analysis only extends through 1999, the cost to future consumers is largely omitted. 23 For
this reason,  we conservatively treat this  as  a direct  subsidy. 24 This has  the  effect of
increasing the cost of reform to government (i.e., it decreases the government's gain from
reform).
4  The Cost-Benefit Analysis
In this  section of the paper, we describe how we implemented the cost-benefit
analysis proposed by Galal et al. (1994) and Jones et al. (1990).  One problem that we had
throughout the analysis was the poor quality of data available before reform. This makes it
difficult to  specify the counterfactual.  An additional problem  is that  it is difficult to
account for performance and quality improvements since DEG did not produce data on
many aspects of its own performance.  To address these problems, we make conservative
assumptions, described below, that will tend to lead to us to underestimate the benefits of
reform.  For this reason, the estimated welfare impact should probably be seen as a lower
bound on the actual benefit of reform.
23.  The IDA loan used to subsidize  the tariffs had a grace  period of six years and a 40-year
maturity.
24. In addition,  SONEG  entered  a matching  asset 'foreign  management  support' on its balance
sheet  to offset the liability. When calculating  the residual  value  of SONEG,  we subtract  this asset
from SONEG's residual  value since it would not have any value to a potential investor. Once
again, the main effect of this action is to lower the government's  gain from reform (i.e., if we
treated  it as having  residual  value  the government  would  gain  significantly  more from  reform.
22A final practical problem when performing the cost-benefit analysis is that the
analysis described in Galal et al. (1994) was designed for analyzing the privatization of a
single company.  In this case, DEG was broken into a private company that is responsible
for operations and maintenance and a public company that is responsible for investment.
Although  SONEG  keeps  detailed  sector  accounts,  using  these  accounts  would  be
misleading because this would assign any profits or losses made by SONEG to  SEEG's
shareholders.  However, to correctly calculate consumer surplus, we need to account for
the part of the tariff that is paid to SONEG and to assess the fiscal effect of reform on the
government we need to account for SONEG's performance.  In practice, what we did was
to include SONEG's revenues as revenues for SEEG and then subtract SONEG's  costs,
expenses  and  profits. 25 This  allows  us  to  calculate  productivity  based  upon  the
performance of both SEEG and SONEG, while not attributing SONEG's profit or loss to
SEEG's shareholders. In summary, amounts paid to SONEG do not affect the welfare of
SEEG's shareholders, but do affect the price and, therefore, the welfare of consumers.
4.1  Revenue and Demand Breakdown
Revenue  is  broken  into  four  separate  categories:  water  supplied  to  private
consumers, water supplied to the government, connection fees and miscellaneous.  Before
1989, 'miscellaneous'  revenue is described as 'works invoiced' in DEG's  accounts, while
after  1989, it includes revenue  from all  sources  except water  supply and  connection
charges. Most 'miscellaneous' revenue after reform is probably from construction of water
infrastructure performed by SEEG on behalf of SONEG. 26 Unlike in the Latin American
cases, neither SEEG nor DEG was responsible for providing sewerage service.  Therefore,
we do not analyze the effect of reform on sewerage. 27
Although, under ideal circumstances, we would like a finer breakdown of revenue
(and demand), this is impossible because neither revenue nor volume billed was broken
25. We also subtract  SONEG's  'profits'.
26. However,  as noted  in Menard  and Clarke  (2000a),  SEEG  has provided  neither SONEG  nor
the authors of this study with a detailed a breakdown  of this category and so it might include
revenues  from other  sources  as well  as revenues  from construction.
27. There are several additional reasons for omitting sewerage.  First, this is a  partial
equilibrium  analysis  and, therefore,  we omit the effect  that reform  has on other  subsectors. Second,
reform of urban water did not have a direct effect on this sub-sector  and, therefore, we might
expect little difference  between the actual and counter-factual  scenarios  concerning sewerage.
Finally, there is very little information  on the performance  of this subsector, making analysis
difficult. For example,  we do not have accurate  estimates  of the number  of customers,  let alone
sector  accounts  for sewerage.
23down further. For example, private consumption was not broken down into residential and
non-residential consumption and neither government nor private consumption was broken
down into metered and unmetered consumption.  The breakdown into government/non-
government  is,  however,  useful.  In  both  of  the  African  case  studies,  government
consumption accounts for a significant portion of the companies'  revenues.  Under the
actual scenario, the Guinean government accounted for 56 percent of total revenue in 1989,
falling to 29 percent in 1997.  In the counterfactual scenario, government consumption is
even more important. Due to the overestimate of government consumption, revenue from
the government accounted for close to two-thirds of total (billed) consumption in 1988.28
For the analysis, we use cubic meters of water as the quantity variable.  In general,
this is the most intuitive measure to use for the cost-benefit analysis.  Unfortunately, we
have to  use the average price  for water, rather than the marginal price.  Although the
marginal price is the economic concept that we are interested in, we do not have sufficient
data to use it in the analysis. Several of the other cost-benefit analyses in this study use the
same approximation (e.g., Alcazar, Abdala, and Zuluaga, 1999). Using the average price,
rather than the marginal price, for metered consumers should not have a large effect on
results since the marginal price schedule is relatively flat and, therefore, the average price
is close to the marginal price.  For example, the average price was GF 880/m 3 in  1996,
while the marginal price varied between GF 680/mn and GF 925/m3. It is more troubling
for unmetered consumption, since the amount that was billed was based upon 'estimated'
consumption.  However, in the absence of improved data, we do not have any better way
of handling this.
A second problem with cubic meters of water is that, especially in Guinea where
the data  is  very  poor,  it  is  difficult to  estimate  cubic meters  consumed when  water
consumption is not metered.  Although, metering was virtually complete by 1995, only 11
percent of connections were metered before reform.  Since estimates of unaccounted-for-
water (UFW) varied widely, it is unclear what actual consumption was. 29 The estimates of
water  consumed for the  years immediately following reform reflected a  relatively  low
estimate of UFW.  However, as we  argue below, this was  likely to be  optimistic and,
therefore, we attempt to partially correct for this in the analysis.
28.  Since reform, the breakdown  of reported revenue is slightly lower than total reported
revenue from water sales.  However,  the difference  is not large (on average,  the breakdown  is 8
percent lower than total revenue). We distribute  the missing revenue  between  the two categories
based  upon  the shares  reported  for that year.
29.  According  to the 1985 audit  report,  UFW  was at least 60 percent  in 1983. However,  one
year later,  the World  Bank (1987)  estimated,  more  optimistically,  that UFW  was 39 percent and, in
1989,  World  Bank (1989)  estimated  that UFW  was  about  35 percent.
244.1.1  Private Water
The main category of demand is private (i.e., non-government) water consumption.
To compute consumer surplus, we need to know how much excess demand there was and
the price elasticity of demand.  Since good estimates are not available for Guinea, we
instead assume parameter values based upon parameter estimates from other countries and
upon the infonnation  available in Guinea itself  In the Section 5, we assume alternate
values to test the sensitivity of results to these assumptions.  Prior to reform, there was
significant excess demand for piped water.  However, as the number of connections and
the price of water increased  (making connections less attractive to  consumers), excess
demand fell.  We assume that at 1998 prices, there was no excess demand.  This seems
reasonable,  given that only  10 percent  of Conakry residents indicated they would  be
willing to pay the cost of a service connection and most said they would not be willing to
pay the average consumer tariff (World Bank, 1997). We used this, along with an assumed
demand elasticity, to calculate the slope and q-intercept parameters for 1998.  In the other
years,  we  simply shift this  demand curve by population growth  (see  Shirley, Xu and
Zuluaga,  1999).  As  in  Shirley, Xu and Zuluaga  (1999), demand was  assumed to  be
identical in the actual and counterfactual scenarios (i.e., reform did not affect demand at
any given price). 30
Unfortunately, to our knowledge, no estimate of the price elasticity of demand is
available for urban consumers in Guinea.  Abdala (1997) and World Bank (1996), which
summarize results from other studies, report a range of price elasticities in developing
countries, with most between -0.2  and -0.6.  However, only one of the reported elasticities
is for an African country - a 1977 study that found a price elasticity of -0.58  for urban
consumers in Kenya.  Further, since the elasticities from these studies are presumably for
consumers who already have connections, they might not be appropriate for Guinea where
much of  the change  in  demand was  presumably due to  new customers'  decisions to
connect.  The World Bank Water Demand Research Team (1993, p.54) reports that their
estimates of elasticities for willingness to connect to an improved source of water with
respect to the average monthly bill were surprisingly large. 31 They estimate elasticities of
-0.7 and -0.4  for willingness to use public taps in Zimbabwe and Kenya and elasticities of
-1.5, -0.7 and -0.7 for willingness to use private connections in India, Brazil and Pakistan.
Although it is not clear whether these estimates, which were for rural areas, are appropriate
30. In particular, this is likely to  underestimate  the true effect of reform, since reform
dramatically  improved  water quality,  which  is likely to shift demand  outwards.
31. The elasticity  of demand  for improved  sources  with  respect  to the average  monthly  tariff is
defined  as the percentage  change  in the probability  of using the improved  source as a result of a I
percent  increase  in average  monthly  bill.
25for urban customers, the experience with reform in Guinea suggests that the elasticity for
willingness to connect might also be large. 32 For this reason, we use a high estimate of the
price elasticity of demand (-0.6).  In the sensitivity analysis, we present results assuming
different price elasticities (see Section 5.2).
4.1.2  Administration Water
In 1990, before any government agencies were metered, government consumption
was estimated to be 7.5 million m3/year. However, once metering was complete it became
clear that this substantially overestimated actual government consumption (World Bank,
1998).33 For this reason, we use the 1991 estimate of government consumption for 1989
and  1990, since nearly  half of  government consumption was metered by  then.  This
assumption makes the 1989 and 1990 estimates of UFW more plausible (51 percent and 49
percent rather than 35 percent  and 31 percent),  given the large amount of UFW after
metering was complete.
In addition to assuming a price elasticity of demand for private consumption, we
also need an  estimate of the price elasticity of  demand for government  consumption.
There  is  very  little  guidance  in  the  literature  regarding this  parameter.  The  central
government did take several steps to reduce government consumption once metering was
complete, with  government consumption dropping 25 percent between  1995 and  1996,
suggesting that the elasticity is not zero.  In general, past  research has  suggested that
elasticities for non-residential service are higher than for residential service (Abdala, 1997;
World Bank, 1996).  However, it is not clear that these estimates, which are usually for
industrial firms, are appropriate for government administration. For this reason, we use the
same elasticity estimate for  government consumption as  for private  consumption.  In
practice,  the  difference  in  government  consumer  surplus  between  the  actual  and
counterfactual scenarios is not greatly affected by changing the elasticity (see Section 5.2).
4.1.3  Connection Fees
A  small part  of  SEEG's revenues comes from  connection fees.  According to
World Bank (1997), the average cost per connection was about 300,000 GNF (about $299
32. In 1994,  Brook Cowen  (1996)  reports that nearly 12,000  connections  were inactive  due to
non-payment  in Guinea (compared  to about 20,000 active connections). Further, World Bank
(1998,  p. 5) reports  that consumers  refusing  to re-connect  after being  disconnected  from the system
for non-payment  continued  to be a problem  after 1995. This suggests  that the availability  of well
water in Conakry  might  make  the elasticity  of water  demand  higher  than in other  cities.
33. In 1995,  when metering  was complete,  government  consumption  was measured  to be 4.7
million  m3/year.
26in 1996), while the average cost to consumers was about 90,000 GNF (about $90 in 1996).
Following Galal et al. (1994), we subtract connections fees from consumer surplus for
(private) water consumption. 34 The implicit assumption is that consumers get utility from
the water that comes from the connection, not from the connection itself.  Hence, potential
consumers compare the net present value of their consumer surplus from usage with the
present value of the connection fee and the stream of tariffs.  Consequently, the cost of the
access fee needs to be subtracted from aggregate consumer surplus.
4.1.4  Miscellaneous
The final category is listed as 'miscellaneous'.  After reform, it seems that most
revenue in this  category is revenue that  SEEG receives  for construction contracted to
SEEG by SONEG.  Between 1989 and  1996, this accounted for 22 percent of SEEG's
revenue, with its contribution increasing over time.  Consumer surplus is not calculated for
this sector.  If SEEG and SONEG were a single company, then the company would not
receive any revenue from 'construction' (other than for the connection fee) and, therefore,
this would not appear as separate source of revenue.  Rather, the cost of construction (i.e.,
in terms of intermediate inputs and labor) would appear as expenditures on the profit and
loss statement. Therefore, we would not compute a consumer surplus in this market in this
partial equilibrium analysis.  For comparability with the counterfactual, therefore, we do
not calculate consumer surplus for 'miscellaneous'.  This is also appropriate because we
are primarily interested in the direct effect of increased access to water. 35
4.2  Counterfactual Scenario
In this section of the paper, we describe the main differences between the actual
and counterfactual scenarios.  In general, specifying a counterfactual scenario is difficult
since it requires considerable detail on something that has not  occurred.  In this  case,
DEG's  poor  accounting and  data collection  standards make it  even harder,  since the
34.  Since  it appears  that most new connections  were  private  and we do not have a breakdown
of access fees in government  and private, this seems the most appropriate  way to handle this
charge. In practice,  this is not likely to have a large effect on results for either the government  or
private consumers  since connection  fees are, in general,  quite small. Of course,  it does  not matter
for total (i.e., government  + private consumer  surplus)  consumer  surplus whether  we subtract it
from government  or private  consumer  surplus.
35.  In addition,  since this is a 'catch-all' category,  it would  be difficult  to make assumptions
regarding  excess  demand  and price  elasticity  of demand.
27counterfactual relies heavily upon information from the pre-reform period. 36 One solution
might be to base the counterfactual on the performance of the private utility in its first year
of operation (i.e., to assume that the public utility would have operated as efficiently as the
private company at that time).  However, this would severely underestimate the gains from
reform, since many of the positive changes appear to have occurred very  quickly.  For
example, improvements in productivity (see Figure  14 and Figure  15), in  billing  and
collection,  and  the  regularization of  unregistered  connections were  all  accomplished
quickly.  Therefore, we are forced to rely upon DEG's unaudited accounts.  In practice,
this is likely to underestimate the benefits of reform since the published accounts probably
overstate DEG's success by not recording arrears to workers and suppliers correctly and by
not provisioning for unpaid bills sufficiently.
In  addition to  concerns about DEG's  accounts, many other  aspects of  DEG's
performance are difficult to  quantify  due  to  unsatisfactory and  inconsistent  data.  In
particular, it is extremely difficult to  quantify service and water quality improvements
associated with the reform.  As noted earlier, service was intermittent before reform and
the water was not potable.  However, since DEG did not keep accurate records of any
measures of service performance (e.g., hours of interrupted service or number of leaks
pending repairs) or water quality (e.g., compliance with WHO standards), it is impossible
to quantify this.  Therefore, since any attempt to include  quality improvements in  the
analysis would be  speculative, we  simply omit them  from the  cost-benefit analysis. 37
Again, this is a conservative way of dealing with the problem since it will underestimate
the gains to  consumers from reform.  Recognizing this, the  estimated welfare gain  to
consumers might be seen as a lower bound on the actual gain.
4.2.1  Investment and Output Growth
One of the differences between the actual and counterfactual scenarios is that we
assume that the World Bank would not have approved funding for the  Second Water
36.  World Bank  (1989, p.10) notes that  DEG's  accounting procedures differed from
international  standards,  that the accounts  were  unaudited  between  1986  and 1988  and that although
DEG's accounts were audited between 1979 and 1985, they could not be certified.  The poor
quality  of DEG's accounts  was  noted in the 1985  consultants'  report,  which concluded  that because
of DEG's poor accounting  practices,  the non-availability  of most relevant  data,  and because  DEG's
budget  was spread  between  several  different  ministries,  it was impossible  to even  perform  an audit.
37. Further,  as noted in Galal et al. (1994,  p. 27), since we are interested  in the difference  in
consumer  surplus  between  the actual  and counterfactual  scenarios,  the assumption  of linear demand
is relatively innocuous. This is because  the area close to the vertical axis will be cancelled  out.
However,  if we assume that quality improvements  move the demand  curve the area close to the
vertical  axis would  no long cancel  out.
28Supply  Project  without  the  government  introducing  some  degree  of  private  sector
participation.  This is supported by World Bank documents and discussions with World
Bank staff involved in the project. 38 Since investment in the actual scenario was mainly
supported through donor's funds (see Figure 3), one of the main assumptions is that DEG
would only perform sufficient investment to maintain assets (i.e., that investment would be.
equal to real depreciation).  This assumption sets real investment at about the observed
level in  1987, which is slightly lower than observed investment in 1988. Consequently,
under the counterfactual scenario, there is no output growth.
This  is  consistent  with  two
50.  _______________________________  observations.  First,  since
45 - average  daily  production  in
40 - Conakry  was  about
35 - 45,000m 3/day  and  maximum
a  30-  /  ^  average  production  was
a  25  estimated to  be  54,000m3,  it
0  20  /  appears  that  little  system
expansion would be  possible in
lo0-X  Conalry  without  upgrading
5  r___  *_._._.______productive  capacity. 3 9 However,
9  37  1989  1991  1993  1995  the  expansion  of  the  pipeline
from  Grandes  Chutes  and  the
|+-  ACTUAL -*-  COUNTERFACTUAL  additional  treatment  capacity
Figure  17: Investment  under  Actual  and  Counterfactual  that would be required would not
Scenarios  have  been  possible  at  the
Source:  Authors'  calculations.  observed  level of investment  in
_  _  _  _ _  _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  the  late  1980s.40  Second,
38.  For example,  World Bank (1987,  p. vi) concludes,  "DEG as presently  constituted  is not
competent to be responsible, either for project implementation  or for system operation and
maintenance."  Although,  as pointed out by World Bank staff involved in project design, it is
possible that a  different type of  contract (possibly with donor support) would have been
implemented  at a later date, it is very difficult  to model the effect that this would have sector
operations.
39.  Pre-reform  data is for 1984  - the last year before  reform that reliable data is available
(World  Bank, 1987,  p. 38). Maximum  production  capacity  was 60,000m3/day,  but this could  not
be maintained  as an average  level of production  (World  Bank, 1989,  p. 45).
40. World  Bank (1989)  reports  that the estimated  cost of the transmission  pipes from Grandes
Chutes to Conakry  and the additional  treatment  plant to treat the water was US$38.8  million (of
US$57.9 million in total investments in Conakry).  However, actual costs were probably higher
29although data quality makes it very difficult to assess the rate of system expansion after the
end of the First Conakry Water Supply Project in the mid-1980s, the assumption of no
expansion seems consistent with DEG's  observed performance.  Between 1984 and 1989,
it appears that most measures of performance were deteriorating. For example, the number
of registered connections in Conakry fell from 11,167 in 1984 to about 10,200 in 1988 and
the  number of active  standpipes fell from  112 to  about 40.4'  Over the  same period
estimated  (national)  consumption  fell  from  12.83  million  m3/year  to  10.89  million
m3/year. 42 Although estimated production increased slightly from  17.5 to  18.9 million
m3/year, this could reflect increased UFW, due to poor maintenance rather than increased
consumption.  In summary, there is little evidence of any significant expansion between
1984 and  1989.  Since assumed investment under the counterfactual is  lower than the
observed average investment in  1987 and 1988, the assumption of no expansion seems
reasonable. 43
4.2.2  Productivity
As noted above, both labor and total factor productivity improved  significantly
following reform (see Figure 14 and Figure 15). However, after this initial improvement,
both measures of productivity appear to have declined slightly through 1996.  In the cost-
benefit analysis, we assume that the improved productivity was a result of reform.  This
seems to be a reasonable assumption, since there is little evidence of increased productivity
before reform. As noted above, most performance measures were falling or holding steady
and the number of staff was relatively constant (504 in  1984 and about 500 in  1988).4
Hence in  the  counterfactual scenario, we  assume that  there  would  be  no  significant
productivity gains.
since total expenditures  on planned investments  in Conakry  were US$84.9  million (rather than
US$57.9  million). Total investment  by DEG  averaged  $4.7 million  in 1987  and 1988  and much of
this would  be required  for maintenance  etc.
41. Connection  and standpipe  data from World  Bank (1987,  p. 38) and World  Bank (1989,  p.
3).
42. World  Bank (1987,  p. 38) and World  Bank (1989).
43. This is also consistent  with assumptions  in World  Bank documents  about  sector  growth if
the Second  Water Supply  Project  had not occurred.
44. Data from  World  Bank  (1987)  and World  Bank (1989).
304.2.3  Price Effects
As  noted earlier,  prices were
increased  significantly
$1.00  following reform (see  Figure
$0.80  18).  In  1988,  the  price  of
$0.70  water  was  $0.14/m 3 in  1996
$0.60  US$.  By 1994, it was close to
$050  l  a dollar.  We assume that the
$0.30  price  increase  was contingent
$0.20  on reform.  This is reasonable
$0.10  for  several  reasons.  First,
$0.  00  given  DEG's  poor  collection
1980  1984  1988  1992  1996  performance  when  prices  were
ctual___Consumer____price______I  low,  it  seems  unlikely  that
l-Actual  Consumer  price  (1996$)  DEG  would  have  been  able  to
Figure 18: Actual Price of Water in 1996 Dollars  collect billed amounts if prices
Note:  Black  market  exchange  rates were used before 1986 to  were  raised  significantly.
convert prices to U.S. dollars.  Price is actual.  price paid by  Second,  given  DEG's  poor
consumers (i.e., price excludes subsidy from the World Bank  performance, it seems unlikely
and government  after reform.). Before  1992,  metering  was very  that  consumers  would  have
rare and actual  payments  were calculated  based  upon estimated
consumption.  bome  the  pnce  inreases
without  corresponding
improvements in  quality.  Finally, in  the actual scenario, the private  operator has  an
incentive to push the government and SONEG to increase prices. There is no evidence that
DEG's  management, who had little motivation to push for higher prices since additional
revenues would go towards funding the general budget, was pushing for price increases
before reform.  In fact, most price increases in the 1970s and 1980s appear to have been
implemented only under donor pressure.  Consequently, under the counterfactual scenario
of continued public ownership, we assume that prices would have stayed constant in real
terms at the 1988 tariff rate.
314.2.4  Fiscal Effects
Before privatization,  DEG
was  receiving  large
6-  . subsidies  from  the
5____________________  government,  mainly  to
service  sector  debt  (see
9  4 - _  .__.__  _  _  Figure 19).  Despite this,
X  -]  |  |  - even after  considering the
16  3  - ~~~~~~~~~~subsidies,  DEG was losing
_  *  o  |  large  amounts  of  money
r:  2 - ~~~~~~~~~(Figure  13).  The  large
losses  that  DEG  was
suffering  from  would  not
have  been  sustainable
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996  without  additional
borrowing or an additional
In Actual  (Gov) *  Actual  (Gov  & WB) Cl Countedactual  infusion  of capital from the
government  (i.e.,  an
Figure  19:  Subsidies  under  the  Actual  and  Counterfactual  increase in  the  subsidy).
Scenarios  DEG's  weak  financial
position would have made
borrowing very difficult.  That is, its financial position was too weak to borrow significant
amounts from private capital markets and donors such as the World Bank generally do not
lend money to finance operating losses. Therefore, we assume that the government would
have slightly increased the subsidy it provides (through capital increases), to make the
company's cash flow close to zero.  Consequently, subsidies would increase from $3.15
million in 1988 to $4.4 million in 1996 (in 1996 US$).  This means that between 1990 and
1992,  subsidies including  the  loan  from  the  World  Bank  are  slightly  lower  in  the
counterfactual scenario than they  are in  the actual scenario.  However,  subsidies then
stabilize at about $4.4 million in the counterfactual scenario, whereas they drop to zero in
the actual scenario.  It appears that the subsidies in the counterfactual scenario would be
feasible for the government in the medium term.  In 1987, the subsidy was equivalent to
about  1 percent of  government consumption.  Under the  counterfactual scenario, this
subsidy increases to only 1.6 percent of government consumption by 1996.
In summary, there are four major differences between the counterfactual and actual
scenarios.  First, we assume that the productivity gains observed upon reform would not
have been achieved in  the counterfactual scenario.  Second, we assume  that the large
investment program observed following reform would not have occurred, but  that DEG
would have maintained existing assets. Third, we assume that the large price increases that
32followed reform would not have been implemented. Finally, given the above assumptions,
we assume that the government would have increased subsidies to cover DEG's  operating
losses.  This final assumption is necessary given the first, second and third assumptions.
4.3  Projections
The projection period in this analysis is only two years (1997 and 1998), making
the time horizon (ten years) comparable with the other case studies. 45 This provides  a
natural break for the analysis, since the original contract with SEEG lasted for ten years.
Further, the renegotiations would make it difficult to predict future outcomes and, in any
case,  the  discount  factors  applied  after  1998  would  make  future  years  relatively
unimportant.
We make  several assumptions for the projection period.  First, we  assume that
prices stay at the 1996 level.  This is consistent with the projections of tariffs provided by
SONEG in mid-1997. Estimates of future demand are based upon data provided in World
Bank (1998).  We use SONEG's estimates of investment and fixed capital for these two
years.  Although it would have been possible to  estimate investment and  fixed capital
based upon past performance for the short projection period, many investment plans and
commitments for these two years would have already been fixed before the middle  of
1997.  Unit costs for other inputs (e.g., for labor and intermediate inputs) are assumed
constant in  real  terms  and we  estimate  quantities of  inputs  assuming  no  immediate
improvement in  productivity.  Given the uneven behavior of  factor productivity  since
reform (see Figure 15), this assumption seems reasonable.  Finally, we estimate the share
of revenues going to SONEG by noting that SONEG is supposed to earn a 2.5 percent rate
of return on capital (World Bank, 1989).
In the sensitivity analysis, we use SONEG's projections of output, investment and
sector (and  company)  accounts to  re-estimate the  gains.  The estimates, which  were
prepared by SONEG in mid-1997, of output were more optimistic than the estimates in the
base scenario and, therefore, the gains are larger.  In practice, although this affects the size
of the gains accruing to each of the partners, it has little effect on relative size or direction
of benefits.
45. See footnote  3.
335  Welfare Impact of Reform
5.1  Winners and Losers
Table  1 presents results from the cost-benefit analysis.  Under the base scenario
described above, the total welfare gain was over $33 million (in 1996 dollars).  Most of
this gain accrued to domestic parties.  Even ignoring the presumably large gains due to
improvements in  service and water quality, private consumers appear to have benefited
considerably from reform. Although the large price increase might have reduced the utility
of connected customers, especially those disconnected for non-payment, this  appears to
have been more than offset by gains accruing to new customers.  Private consumers who
were not able to get connections under DEG were better off paying the high tariff and
receiving water than not receiving water at all.
The govermment  benefited considerably in fiscal terms, although the increased price
of water meant that the government lost consumer surplus. 46 The drop in consumer surplus
for the government contrasts with the increase for private consumers primarily because
private consumption increased considerably between 1989 and  1996, while government
consumption dropped.  That is, since government consumption was not severely rationed
before reform, government consumers did not  benefit  from expanded coverage.  It  is
important to note that the loss in govermment  consumer surplus is calculated based upon
the assumption that the government pays its water bill (in time and in full).  Since this has
not been the case, the 'true'  price of water to government is likely to be considerably less
than the assumed price in this study.  In this respect, the loss in consumer surplus for the
government is likely to be considerably smaller than the estimated loss.  Foreign buyers
also benefited modestly from reform, although their gain was small compared to the gain
that accrued to consumers and to the government.
46. The cost-benefit  analysis  is likely  to underestimate  the actual  gain due to drop in subsidies.
For the first few years following  reform, subsidies  were higher than they would have been under
the counterfactual.  However,  by 1996, subsidies  had been eliminated  in the actual scenario,  but
remained  high under  the counterfactual.  Since  the projections  only went through 1998  (the last full
year of the contract),  we ignore  these future  gains.
34Table 1: Winners and Losers from Reform
Gain
Total gain  Per capita gain  (as percent of 1988
(millions 1996 US$)  (1996 US$)  output)
Total  $33.2  $6.12  126.6%
Total Domestic  $293  $5.41  111.9%
Government  $9.8  $1.81  37.4%
Fiscal  Effect  $17.6  $3.25  67.2%
Government
Consumer
Surplus  -$7.8  -$1.44  -29.8%
Consumers  $19.5  $3.6  74.5%
Foreign  Buyers  $3.9  $0.71  14.7%
5.2  Sensitivity  Analysis
In this  section  of  the  paper,  we  explore  what  effect  certain  assumptions  have  on  the
distribution  and  level  of  gains.  Three  of  the  alternate  scenarios  concern  parameters  in  the
demand  equation,  one  concerns  treatment  of  the  management  fee  that  SEEG  pays  to  the
foreign  buyers  and  two  concern  projections.  Although  the  different  assumptions  affect  the
magnitude  of  the  gains  accruing  to  various  partners  in  the  project,  they  do  not  affect  the
direction  of  results  or the  main  conclusions  of  the  study.
5.2.1  0.35 Elasticity
In  the  first  alternate  scenario,  the  only  difference  is that  the  point  estimate  of  the
price  elasticity  of  demand  from  is changed  from  0.6  to  0.35.  This  is  similar  to  the  demand
elasticities  used  in  the  other  case  studies  (see  Shirley,  Xu  and  Zuluaga,  2000;  Alcazar,  Xu,
and  Zuluaga,  2000;  and  Alcazar,  Abdala  and  Shirley,  2000).47  The  main  effect  of  this
change  is to  increase  the  gain  to domestic  consumers  from  $19.5  million  to  $41.0  million.
47.  Note  that  in these  cases,  coverage  was far higher  than  in this  case  study.  Price  increases,
therefore,  might  mainly  affect  consumption  by  connected  customers  rather  than  new  connections.
If, as suggested  by the results  in World Bank  Water  Demand  Research  Team  (1993),  elasticities  for
new  connections  are  higher  than  elasticities  of  demand  for  consumption  by  already  connected
customers,  the higher  elasticities  might  be more appropriate  in Guinea.
355.2.2  0.70 Elasticity
In the second alternate scenario, we move the elasticity in the opposite direction,
making it equal to the estimate for the elasticity of new connections with respect to the
monthly bill for Brazil and Pakistan (0.7). This has the opposite effect, reducing consumer
surplus for both the government and for private consumers.  However, private consumer
surplus remains positive under this scenario.
5.2.3  Excess Demand
In the base scenario, we assume that total demand is satisfied at the observed price
in the actual scenario in 1998.  This assumption, however, might not be attractive since
SONEG had  not  extended the  distribution network  far  enough  to  reach  all  areas  of
Conakry (or all areas of other cities).  In this alternate scenario, we assume that the actual
demand at the observed prices in  1998 would be  approximately equal to  the demand
assumed by  SONEG in their projections.  The main effect that  this has is  to increase
consumer surplus considerably.  The intuition behind this change is that assuming excess
demand shifts the demand curve outwards relative to the base scenario.  This increases
consumer surplus more in  the actual scenario because actual quantity consumed is  far
larger than in the counterfactual scenario. That is, since the demand curves are the same in
the two scenarios the increase in area under the demand curve is greater in the actual
scenario since the quantity consumed is greater.  Assuming greater excess demand would
lead to a greater increase in consumer surplus.
5.2.4  Management Fee
In addition to ownership of SEEG, the foreign owners also signed a management
contract to provide home-office support for  SEEG's  operations (e.g., data  processing,
water treatmnent,  etc.)  The contract allows remuneration for this  support to be  set at 2
percent of SEEG's  revenues (World Bank,  1989, p.  9).  To the extent that these costs
represent real costs to the foreign companies, they should not be treated as returns to the
foreign owners. However, it is possible that the entire fee was not used to cover real costs.
In this scenario, we treat the entire 2 percent fee as if it were  a transfer to the foreign
owners (i.e., that they provided nothing real in return for the fee). Since the foreign buyers
presumably provide some services in return for the fee, this provides an upper bound on
the gain to foreign buyers.  This marginally increases the gain to the foreign owners.
5.2.5  SONEG's Projections
As  noted above  SONEG also  provided us  with projections  of revenues, costs,
capital expenditures, quantities sold, etc.  In general, the main difference was that  the
quantities  of  water  sold  (and,  therefore,  revenues  from  sales)  were  larger  than  the
36quantities projected in World Bank (1998). Again, although the gains are larger than in the
base case, they are qualitatively similar.
5.2.6  SONEG's Revenue Projections with World  Bank Quantity Projections
Finally, we repeat the previous exercise using SONEG's projections of revenues,
costs, etc., but using the World Bank's  projections of quantity of water sold.  To keep
revenues the same as in SONEG's projections we increase prices.  This leads to smaller
(although still positive) gains to consumers and larger gains to the government and foreign
investors.  The net gain is close to the net gain in the base scenario.




0.35  0.70  Excess  Manage- i  SONEG  WorldBank
Elasticity  Elasticity  demand i  mentfee  projections  quantity
Total  $56.2  $28.4  $38.7  $34.2  $44.2  $32.1
Total  Domestic  $52.3  $24.5  $34.8  $29.3  $39.5  $27.1
Government  $11.3  $9.5  $9.8  I  $9.8  $11.5  $12.0
Fiscal Effect  $17.6  $17.6  17.6  i  $17.6  $19.3  $19.2
Government
Consumer
Surplus  -$63  -$8.1  $7.8  -$7.8  I  -$7.8  -$7.2
Consumers  $41.0  $15.0  $25.0  I  $19.5  $28.0  $15.1
Foreign  Buyers  $3.9  $3.9  $3.9  '  $4.9  $4.7  $5.0
6  Conclusion
In  summary, most indicators show that performance has improved  significantly
since  reform.  Water  and  service quality  has  improved and  coverage  has  increased
modestly.  In addition, all measures of productivity have increased, SEEG has recorded
modest profits since the reform and government subsidies were eliminated following the
end of the transition period.  Although after initial gains in productivity, improvements
appear to  have stalled  or reversed, the  decline is probably primarily due  to  the  large
expansion in productive capacity, which was completed before the corresponding increase
in distributive capacity.  Consequently, since there is excess capacity for production, as
new connections come on line, productivity is likely to improve again.  The increase in the
37number  of  connections  in  1997,  which  resulted  in  a  noticeable  increase  in
connections/employee, strongly suggests that this is the case. 48
The cost-benefit analysis supports the view that sector performance has improved
since reform.  Although the different scenarios present different estimates of the total gain
from reform, qualitatively they are similar.  The government gains through the effect that
reform has on its finances, but loses consumer surplus. In aggregate, consumers gain from
reform, although the magnitude of the  gain is  somewhat sensitive to  different model
assumptions.  Consumers gained through expanded coverage, which more than made up
for the loss they faced due to increased prices.  Finally, the foreign buyers gained only a
modest amount from reform compared to  either consumers or the government.  These
estimates are likely to underestimate the true gains from reform (to consumers and to the
government) for several reasons.  First, we ignore any gains from improved service and
water quality.  In practice, the improved quality (i.e., by making water potable) is likely to
have been  one  of  the most  significant gains to  consumers.  Second, we  ignore  any
externalities related to improved health.  Although it is not clear how large these gains are
likely to have been, since there was no related expansion of the sewerage network, they
might have been substantial. 49 Finally, we treat DEG's  accounts as if they truly reflect
DEG's performance before reform. In practice, they are likely to overstate DEG's  success
and,  therefore,  we  are  likely  to  overstate  DEG's  probable  performance  in  the
counterfactual.  Therefore, we  conclude that  there were  large gains  compared  to  any
reasonable assumptions about performance under continued public ownership.
Although,  as noted  above, most  performance indicators  have  improved,  some
problems remain.  The three most troublesome areas are unaccounted for water, poor
collection rates and high prices. Although unaccounted for water is high, this might not be
a  major  concern  since  potential  production  is  currently  far  higher  than  current
consumption.  Since the marginal cost of water (primarily for treatment) is relatively low,
it might not  be  worthwhile to  do  expensive repairs when the  system  is not  capacity
constrained.  The other two concerns are related.  Collection, although improved since the
period of public ownership, remains poor from both the private  and the public  sector.
Between 1990 and 1996, provisions for unpaid bills accounted for about 20 percent  of
sector revenues. Although the weak institutional environment makes it difficult to increase
collection  rates, there  are some  steps  that  the government  could take  to  reduce  this
problem.  First, the government could ensure that  it pays  its own bills on time  - the
governnent  accounted for about 30 percent of total sales in  1996 and, therefore,  could
48.  The number  of SEEG  employees  has also continued  to increase,  however,  reaching  over
500 employees  by the end of 1999  (World  Bank  files).
49.  Menard  and Shirley  (2000)  notes that gains in health are greater  when  both sewerage  and
water service  are provided.
38reduce the billing problem simply by paying its own bill.  In addition, legislation allowing
SEEG  to  collect  unpaid  bills  from  private  individuals  might  help  SEEG  boost  the
collection rate.  If the government took these actions, it would go a  long way towards
lowering prices.
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